(0:00) Recently, a story that seems to have come straight out of an espionage movie script (0:05) came to light. (0:06) A Russian spy, posing as a Brazilian, tried to infiltrate the heart of power (0:14) in the capital of the United States, Washington, D.C. (0:18) This story, which might seem extraordinary or unusual, in fact, when we look (0:24) more closely, it is possible to identify a pattern, a trend. (0:30) The Russian secret service has a preference for infiltrating spies in Portuguese-speaking countries, especially Brazil.
(0:42) In fact, for example, the biggest espionage scandal in NATO's history involved a (0:48) Russian spy posing as a Portuguese person. (0:51) But my focus today is to tell a more recent story about this Russian preference (0:58) and explain how our bureaucracy here in Brazil, our legal system, the laws, (1:06) our society, in short, our reality, might actually be contributing to this (1:13) Russian predilection. (1:15) Do you remember when you got into the college of your dreams? (1:18) It must have been a very happy moment.
(1:21) It was no different for Victor Miller Ferreira, when he was accepted into the master's program in International Relations at Johns Hopkins University, a prestigious institution in the heart (1:33) of Washington, D.C., in 2018. (1:37) The story of Victor Miller Ferreira, or rather, Sergei Cherkasov, unfolds like a plot (1:44) of espionage worthy of a sophisticated novel. (1:49) Sergei, a Russian spy from distant Kaliningrad, embarked on a journey of nearly (1:55) ten years, meticulously forging the identity of Victor Miller to infiltrate the political heart (2:02) of the United States.
(2:04) Under the guise of an exemplary Brazilian student, a facade far from his true essence, (2:10) Sergei was, in reality, building a spy network. (2:16) He was part of a secret cell of Russian spies, strategically positioned (2:21) in Washington, D.C., with the mission of deeply infiltrating the structures of American power. (2:27) His target was nothing less than the pillars of U.S. national security, from the Department (2:33) of State to the CIA.
(2:35) Passing through everything that might interest the GRU, the feared Russian Military Intelligence Service. (2:49) I will tell this story from the beginning and in-depth. (2:54) The embryo of Victor Miller Ferreira was carefully constructed based on a series of forged documents (3:02) that served as a cocoon for the metamorphosis of Sergei Cherkasov into his new identity.
(3:11) In 2009, a new birth certificate, therefore of an invented name, was skillfully (3:17) inserted into the records, anticipating Cherkasov's arrival in Brazil, followed by the issuance (3:23) of a driver's license made with the photo of a stranger. (3:26) Evidence of meticulous preparation by a network of GRU collaborators and agents already established here in Brazil.
(3:34) This operation exploited loopholes in Brazilian immigration and civil registration systems, (3:40) relying not only on the collaboration of local agents but also on bribes, (3:45) as demonstrated by the gift of a Swarovski necklace to a notary involved in the (3:50) certification of fraudulent documents.
(3:53) With a solid base already established, Cherkasov advanced in consolidating his Brazilian identity (3:58) by acquiring critical documents such as the CPF and a passport, all under the name (4:05) of Victor Miller. (4:07) The spy even commented on the alarming ease of obtaining these documents here (4:11) in Brazil. (4:12) He said that it didn't take more than a dozen dollars to get such documents, (4:18) revealing the system's susceptibility to corruption.
(4:24) In the years that followed, Cherkasov, under his forged identity, integrated into the social (4:29) and economic fabric of Brazil, even working at a travel agency suspected (4:34) of being a front for GRU operations, which later ceased its activities. (4:39) This period of preparation and integration served as a prologue to the complex web (4:45) of espionage that Cherkasov was about to weave, using Brazil as a stage for (4:50) his clandestine acts. (4:52) He presented himself as a product of a fragmented childhood, marked by the loss (4:58) of his mother and a series of temporary caregivers, a story designed to evoke sympathy and (5:05) divert suspicion.
(5:06) Delving deeper into the fiction, the GRU, in its operation in Brazil, assigned Cherkasov (5:12) a fictitious maternal lineage, naming him the son of Jurassi Elisa Ferreira, a Brazilian (5:18) whose death in 1993 supposedly left him an orphan. (5:23) However, investigations and statements from relatives, such as Juliano Einhardt, nephew (5:29) of Ferreira, contested this claim, asserting that she never had children. (5:35) Among the most intriguing evidence found in the case was a detailed document on (5:40) Cherkasov's computer, which resembled a study guide for the role of his life.
(5:47) This text, written in fluent Portuguese, began with the statement (5:52) "I am Victor Miller Ferreira," unfolding into a series of fabricated personal details, (5:58) from claims of a peculiar aversion to the smell of fish in Rio de Janeiro to memories (6:04) of a poster of Pamela Anderson in a mechanic's workshop, a supposed workplace that was (6:10) never confirmed. (6:11) This document also anticipated and tried to neutralize potential questions about (6:15) Cherkasov's distinctive physical features, with his blonde hair and a strange accent, (6:21) proposing explanations that included German ancestry and long stays abroad (6:27) that would have affected his language skills. (6:31) The mention of being nicknamed "gringo" by schoolmates, in a place he never (6:36) studied, revealed a calculated attempt to build an identity based on loneliness (6:41) and isolation.
(6:43) The presence of this document, a decade after its creation, highlights not only the individual incompetence (6:48) of the spy in erasing his tracks but also a broader systemic failure (6:53) in the methods employed by the GRU in their clandestine operations. (6:57) This tendency towards carelessness has, ironically, almost become a trademark in operations (7:03) conducted by the GRU in recent years. (7:05) The audacity with which the GRU has executed its missions, from digital infiltration to acts (7:11) of poisoning on foreign soil, has highlighted an apparent indifference to completely (7:16) covering their tracks.
(7:17) Notable incidents include the cyberattack on the Democratic National Committee in (7:23) the United States in 2015, the poisoning of former spy Sergei Skripal in England in (7:29) 2018, and the attempted assassination of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, which now ended up being (7:35) successfully carried out. (7:37) These risky actions seem to follow an operational line where subtlety is not (7:43) a priority and traces are left everywhere. (7:46) Cherkasov, despite these questionable methods of his employer, advanced rapidly in (7:51) his infiltration mission.
(7:53) His academic journey led him from Trinity College Dublin to prestigious institutions (8:00) in Washington, D.C., where his admission to Johns Hopkins University marked a significant step (8:06) towards his goals. (8:09) The achievement was so celebrated by Cherkasov that he shared his euphoria with his (8:15) superiors in the GRU, proclaiming in an email, (8:18) "Man, I did it, I really did it." (8:22) Interestingly, Cherkasov's presence at Johns Hopkins University, despite his true (8:29) and original identity, did not raise suspicions when he arrived there.
(8:35) He was perceived as an older, more competent student, posing as a Brazilian (8:41) with Irish ancestry. (8:44) A cover that, according to Eugene Finkel, a professor at Johns Hopkins and a native (8:51) Russian speaker, was convincing enough to explain any peculiarities in his accent. (8:57) This phase of Cherkasov's operation illustrates not only the complexity of (9:03) modern espionage tactics but also the ability of trained individuals to deeply immerse (9:09) in foreign cultures and societies.
(9:12) In other words, he managed to deceive even a native Russian speaker and professor of international relations, (9:18) someone who had every reason to uncover the spy's true identity. (9:22) But not everything was perfect, far from it. (9:25) Within the academic environment of Johns Hopkins, a casual encounter between Cherkasov, under (9:31) the disguise of Victor Miller, and a former U.S. Navy officer, also fluent (9:36) in Russian, introduced an element of suspicion in the otherwise impeccable facade of the Russian spy.
(9:44) The Russian spy and the former U.S. Navy officer shared a common interest in motorcycles (9:51) and went for a ride together. (9:53) During this interaction, as the Russian was speaking, the American noticed a Russian accent. (10:02) And since he spoke Russian, he questioned and asked the spy if he had any (10:09) Russian ancestry.
(10:11) The spy, Cherkasov, quickly responded, (10:14) "No, no, I have German ancestry, I am German," and disappeared, never wanting to (10:21) meet him again. (10:23) This shows a bit of the difficulty in maintaining this appearance, this facade, this story (10:30) in unexpected situations like this. (10:33) This specific episode did not lead to an in-depth investigation or greater suspicion (10:41) by the institution or others about Cherkasov's identity.
(10:46) Additionally, another factor that went unnoticed, perhaps a failure of the university, was Cherkasov's ability (10:55) to finance his studies. (10:59) It is important to note that a master's course at such an American college costs thousands (11:07) of dollars and he told a story of coming from a very humble family in (11:12) Brazil and he had the money to promptly pay for the two years without any scholarship. (11:19) This was not questioned by the college, the college did not want to understand where this money or these funds came from to pay for his course.
(11:29) Later, when he was arrested in Brazil, Tcherkasov came up with an unusual explanation (11:33) for how he managed to finance his expensive education in the United States. (11:39) He said he made money through gambling and bitcoin. (11:43) However, the FBI discovered that he was actually receiving money regularly from his superiors (11:49) in Russia and that he was moving it through accounts in the United States and Ireland.
(11:53) Cherkasov sent his resume to various jobs, including internships at prestigious places (12:00) such as the United Nations, think tanks, financial institutions, media outlets, and even (12:08) positions within the American government. (12:10) But with the coronavirus pandemic affecting the job market, the spy ended up not (12:15) securing any of these jobs and had to leave the United States in September (12:20) 2020, just before his student visa expired. (12:23) Back in Brazil, Tcherkasov wasted no time and continued to use his connections in (12:28) Washington.
(12:28) In November 2021, with tensions between Russia and Ukraine escalating, he sent reports (12:34) to Russia detailing American officials' perceptions of Moscow's actions. (12:39) These activities show how Tcherkasov maintained his engagement in espionage activities (12:44) even outside the United States, highlighting the continuity of his mission even after (12:50) his stay in the country ended. (12:51) In the emails Tcherkasov sent, he detailed information he claimed to have obtained from consultants (12:57) at think tanks supposedly in contact with high-level figures in the Biden administration, (13:02) including Secretary of State Antony Blinken.
(13:06) In one of the reports, he mentioned that Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin had (13:11) been instructed not to show any possibility of U.S. military involvement in (13:16) Ukraine, suggesting a non-intervention stance by the U.S. in the imminent conflict. (13:22) While making these reports, Tcherkasov encountered a new opportunity. (13:28) He received an internship offer at the International Criminal Court (ICC), an institution (13:33) long considered hostile by Moscow due to its mandate to prosecute genocides, (13:39) war crimes, and other serious violations of international law.
(13:43) The prospect of working at the ICC represented a valuable chance for Cherkasov to infiltrate (13:49) a crucial international organization, potentially facilitating Russian espionage operations against a legal body that could threaten Russian interests (13:59) on the world stage. (14:00) It is worth remembering that recently, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant (14:06) against the Russian president for crimes committed in the war in Ukraine. (14:11) Tcherkasov, working there at the ICC, would have access to databases, and (14:19) the security of the court's digital systems, and with this, he could break into or penetrate (14:27) and access very valuable information.
(14:30) In preparation for his new role, Cherkasov carefully organized his preparations (14:37) in Brazil. (14:38) He hid electronic devices in secret locations along a trail near (14:44) São Paulo, leaving detailed instructions for his Russian contacts on how to retrieve them. (14:50) This demonstrates a well-established communication network with his superiors in Russia, (14:55) facilitated by the discreet environment that Brazilian territory offered.
(14:58) However, in 2022, when boarding for Amsterdam, Cherkasov did not imagine that he was walking (15:06) into a carefully planned trap by the Dutch intelligence service to (15:13) arrest him. (15:14) The Dutch were alerted by detailed information provided by the FBI and the interception operation (15:21) at the airport involved extensive interrogation and thorough analysis (15:27) of his electronic devices. (15:29) The use of facial recognition technology to match the image on Cherkasov's passport (15:35) with his pre-GRU photos was the final blow.
(15:42) This critical moment marked the end of Cherkasov's espionage operation, exposing not (15:46) only his intentions but also highlighting the effectiveness of international cooperation and (15:51) intelligence sharing between the United States and its allies. (15:55) Tcherkasov was forced to return to Brazil, where, upon landing, he was detained by local authorities. (16:01) Even on his way back to Brazil, Tcherkasov did not miss the opportunity to communicate with (16:05) his ex-girlfriend in Russia, asking for help to contact his superiors (16:10) in the GRU.
(16:10) Shortly after being arrested in Brazil, Cherkasov clung to his identity as Victor Miller (16:17) and vehemently denied the accusations of the Dutch authorities, claiming that what happened was (16:24) a case of mistaken identity. (16:26) Two months after all this, the Dutch authorities decided to make the case public, (16:32) issuing a press release detailing Tcherkasov's failed attempt to enter (16:37) the country, along with the strange biography he had created for himself. (16:42) This action aimed not only to expose Russian espionage activities (16:46) but also to raise awareness among allied governments about the danger posed by illegal spies operating under false identities, surprising no one at all.
(16:56) Russia denied any involvement in his espionage activities, demanding his (17:01) extradition from Brazil on allegations that American authorities consider to be more (17:06) lies. (17:07) According to the Russians, Tcherkasov was neither a student nor a spy as he claimed, (17:13) but a fugitive involved in heroin trafficking seeking to escape Russian justice. (17:19) The story shocked the academic community at Johns Hopkins.
(17:23) Remember the professor I mentioned, Eugene Finkel, who was Tcherkasov's professor? (17:28) So, he was Ukrainian and he wrote a recommendation letter for the Russian spy (17:35) to get a job at the International Criminal Court. (17:39) When he found out the whole story, of course, he was devastated. (17:42) First, because he was Ukrainian and already a critic and, thus, feared Russia's actions, (17:48) and he ended up helping a Russian spy get a job at an institution that was defending Ukraine and trying to condemn Russia for its atrocities (18:02) against Ukrainians.
(18:04) Returning to Brazil, Cherkasov was confident that the 15-year sentence would not (18:11) be upheld. (18:12) "No way I am staying here," he said in a message on June 7 to the Russian woman (18:17) he had asked his GRU bosses for permission to marry. (18:22) In a message sent at the end of August, he assured the same woman that his case (18:26) would be resolved in a matter of weeks and that by New Year's they would be walking (18:31) through the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg.
(18:35) "Everything will be fine," he said, signing off as a prisoner of war. (18:39) Two years later, today, Tcherkasov remains imprisoned in Brazil without a clear destination (18:47) for his future. (18:50) The Supreme Federal Court (STF) granted his extradition to Russia for charges of passport and document (18:58) forgery, a 15-year sentence, remember? (19:02) However, the STF stated that he could not be extradited until the Federal Police concluded (19:08) another espionage investigation.
(19:12) Thus, his case is stalled and unresolved. (19:16) This whole story reveals great concern and embarrassment for Brazilian authorities. (19:25) Obviously, if Russian spies can come to Brazil, acquire so many documents, (19:31) use the country as an operational base, and commit so many frauds with enormous ease, it (19:40) shows the fragility of our system. It shows how Brazil is a country that invites (19:48) this kind of action.
(19:51) Brazilian authorities have said they are reviewing procedures and mechanisms (19:58) to make it harder or to correct these possible frauds. (20:04) But this whole story of Victor or Sergei is just one of many stories of Russian spies (20:12) posing as Brazilians. (20:16) To give you an idea, there is another story from 2021 of a Russian spy who (20:21) was arrested in Norway using a false identity of a Brazilian born in the 1980s in a city (20:28) called Padre Bernardo, in the interior of Goiás.
(20:34) Authorities still have not discovered where the real person, the owner of the identity (20:40) the Russian spy took over and used as his own, is located. (20:45) A third incident also in 2021, at the end of 2021, involved a businessman from Rio de Janeiro who left (20:53) on a trip abroad and disappeared. (20:57) His friends in Brazil were desperate, worried, and started a (21:03) campaign on social media to find him.
(21:08) After some time, authorities in Greece came forward and said that the person from Rio de Janeiro (21:17) was not from Rio de Janeiro and was actually a Russian spy who had gone to Greece (21:23) to meet his girlfriend, wife, who was a Russian spy in Greece, and that (21:29) the two had passed through and fled to Russia. (21:33) Authorities have never spoken about the matter again, and the Brazilian authorities do not comment (21:38) on the case either. (21:39) These incidents triggered a major investigation in Brazil to find out (21:44) if our country has indeed become an incubator for Russian spies attempting to penetrate the West.
(21:53) This puts Brazil in a very difficult, delicate, and concerning situation because investigations (22:03) by Brazilian authorities say little about the subject, but they believe that many other (22:10) Russian spies are located here in Brazil, preparing for operations (22:17) worldwide. (22:18) The more isolated Russia becomes, the harder it will be for Russian spies with (22:25) a Russian passport or identity to penetrate Western countries. (22:30) So, having a passport, an identity, a story coming from an already Western country (22:37) makes Brazil very attractive.
(22:39) And all these examples I have shown you put Brazil in this complicated situation. (22:46) We need to be aware of what is happening, with the ease with which these spies (22:53) come here. (22:54) That is why Brazil needs to understand this problem.
(22:57) Authorities and society need to pay attention, and we need mechanisms (23:02) for oversight, resilience, combating these frauds, and the ease with which passports, identities, and immigrants coming from other places (23:18) can bypass our system with fake documents. (23:21) In short, Brazil needs to be vigilant because it is becoming a sanctuary for receiving (23:28) spies from Russia and perhaps other dictatorships that will use our country as a base to (23:35) penetrate the rest of the world.
Professor Heni Ozi Cuckier (HOC)
Related Posts:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DDuOik27Gw0
https://blogdejoseoctaviodettmann.blogspot.com/2024/07/o-brasil-e-uma-fabrica-de-espioes-russos.html (the original transcription, in protuguese)
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