How the process of dechristianization of banks occurred - economy, power, and the rupture of the christian moral order (revised and expanded edition of a 2015 article)

Over the past decades, it has become relatively common to encounter individuals expressing a general hostility toward banks. Such a stance, although often understandable in light of historical abuses and recurring financial crises, usually stems from a fundamental misunderstanding. The problem does not lie in the mere existence of financial institutions but in the moral foundation that guides them. The mere presence of banks in society does not, in itself, constitute a moral failure; on the contrary, under certain historical circumstances, such institutions were legitimate instruments for organizing economic life.

In a certain sense, it can be said that Christian civilization itself developed highly sophisticated forms of financial organization. The Church, as a visible society founded on charity, always required some form of prudent administration of material goods. Monasteries, dioceses, hospitals, universities, and charitable works relied over the centuries on administrative structures capable of managing resources, protecting assets, and distributing wealth according to concrete needs. In this sense, the Christian tradition never rejected the existence of economic instruments; the key issue has always been the subordination of these instruments to a moral order.

Christian social doctrine, developed from late antiquity and later systematized by scholasticism, has always asserted that material goods have a social function. Private property is recognized as legitimate but not absolute. The goods of the earth exist to serve the common good and to ensure the dignified sustenance of individuals and families. Prudent management of wealth was therefore not seen as an expression of greed but as a moral responsibility linked to justice and charity.

During the European Middle Ages, numerous financial institutions emerged that operated precisely within this moral framework. Italian commercial cities such as Florence, Genoa, and Venice developed banking systems capable of financing long-distance trade, organizing credit, and ensuring monetary circulation in a politically fragmented continent. Major banking houses—among them the Medici, Bardi, and Peruzzi—played an important role in the economic organization of late medieval Europe. Yet, even in these highly dynamic commercial environments, the moral question of usury remained central.

Concern with usury was not a marginal detail of medieval moral theology. For scholastic theologians, money as an instrument of exchange did not intrinsically possess the capacity to generate profit when lent for immediate consumption. Charging interest on loans intended solely for consumption was considered unjust because it demanded payment for something that, in itself, produced no real value. This position was systematized by Thomas Aquinas, who emphasized the distinction between real economic activity and financial exploitation¹.

At the same time, institutions emerged specifically aimed at counteracting the social effects of usury. Among the most notable were the so-called montes pietatis, developed mainly from the 15th century under the influence of Franciscan preachers. These institutions offered credit with minimal or zero interest to poorer populations who would otherwise have to turn to moneylenders. The goal was not to abolish credit but to restore its social function within a moral order².

The transition from the Middle Ages to the modern financial sphere cannot be understood without considering the influence of the School of Salamanca. Between the 16th and 17th centuries, Spanish theologians and jurists—including Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, and Luis de León—developed sophisticated concepts concerning economic justice, market value, and lending. They argued that the just price arises from the balance of supply and demand but always under the Christian moral framework, protecting the vulnerable from financial exploitation. Furthermore, the School of Salamanca developed detailed doctrines on contracts and international trade that anticipated concepts of credit and financing crucial for the modern global economy³. These reflections constitute an intellectual bridge between medieval economic prudence and emerging capitalist institutions.

The process of dechristianization of financial institutions did not occur suddenly. It was the result of gradual cultural, religious, and economic transformations in Western Europe between the 16th and 18th centuries. One of these transformations was a profound change in how wealth was interpreted in certain religious contexts. In certain strands of Protestantism, material success began to be regarded as a sign of divine election. Max Weber analyzed this shift, studying the relationship between specific forms of Protestant asceticism and the formation of the modern capitalist mindset⁴.

Although Weber’s thesis has been widely debated, it highlights a real change in European economic sensibilities. In traditional Christian thought, wealth was always treated with moral caution. It could be an instrument of good when used charitably but could also become a source of pride and injustice. When such moral caution disappears, wealth tends to transform from a means into an end.

Werner Sombart, in studying the emergence of the bourgeois spirit in Europe, observed that the mentality of modern economy gradually began to favor unlimited capital accumulation. The figure of the medieval merchant, still embedded in a communal moral order, gave way to an economic actor whose primary orientation became the continuous expansion of capital⁵.

A decisive institutional transformation occurred at the end of the 17th century with the creation of the Bank of England in 1694. Unlike medieval financial institutions, which mainly arose to facilitate trade or organize local credit, the new banking model developed in close cooperation with centralized political authority. Consolidated public debt financed by private institutions inaugurated a new phase in European economic history. From this moment, the relationship between the financial system and state power became increasingly intertwined.

Money, which initially functioned as a medium of exchange, gradually began to perform functions of power and influence. Disordered love of money—condemned since antiquity by Christian teaching as the root of numerous evils—began to organize increasingly complex economic structures. When wealth ceases to be a means and becomes an end, there emerges a tendency toward economic concentration.

This dynamic manifests through the progressive accumulation of the faculties to use, enjoy, and dispose of life’s goods in an ever-smaller number of hands. Initially, the phenomenon develops discreetly. Over time, however, it becomes institutionalized through increasingly sophisticated economic mechanisms.

Among these mechanisms are cartels, trusts, and other forms of business associations, which often eliminate real competition. Under the pretext of economic rationalization, such structures can turn markets into instruments of domination and control. Wilhelm Röpke warned that an economy entirely disconnected from a higher moral order inevitably leads to the erosion of the foundations of society⁶.

To the disordered love of money often adds another spiritual deformation: the sacralization of political power. When the state or nation is treated as a sacred entity, what can be called monetary nationalism emerges. In this context, national currency ceases to be merely an instrument of economic circulation and begins to perform geopolitical functions.

The international monetary system established after World War II at Bretton Woods is an example of this dynamic. A single national currency began to serve as a universal measure of value for a large portion of the global economic system. Although the system has evolved since then, the relationship between political power and monetary power remains a structural pillar of the contemporary global economy.

Another key aspect of the dechristianization of the economy was the gradual normalization of usury. The classical distinction between legitimate capital income and financial exploitation was progressively abandoned in many economic contexts. When this distinction disappears entirely, space opens for practices ranging from disorderly speculation to institutionalized financial dependence.

Economic history repeatedly shows that societies where usury becomes socially tolerated often create structures of permanent indebtedness. In extreme cases, such structures may approach systematic forms of economic exploitation.

In the 21st century, technological development has greatly increased the complexity of these financial structures. Automated trading systems, real-time global markets, highly sophisticated derivatives, and the emergence of digital currencies have radically transformed the circulation of money in the modern world. However, these technological innovations do not change the fundamental problem: the economy remains dependent on the moral foundation that guides it.

Without this foundation, any financial innovation risks becoming merely a new instrument of power concentration. Technology may improve transactional efficiency but cannot replace the moral principles that should guide economic life.

The true challenge of our time, therefore, is not to destroy banks or dismantle financial systems, but to restore the moral order that must govern them. Financial institutions can serve the common good when subordinated to justice, prudence, and charity. The economy must remain subordinate to moral order, not the other way around.

Ultimately, every economic order reflects a particular conception of humanity and the purpose of human life. When the spiritual foundation of society is the love of money, the outcome inevitably tends toward concentration of power and gradual erosion of freedom. When, on the contrary, the foundation is love of God and neighbor, the economy regains its proper place: a tool ordered toward the common good.

Notes

1. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-II, q.78 — on usury and the moral function of money.

2. Jacques Le Goff, La Bourse et la Vie — on medieval usury and Italian financial institutions.

3. Francisco de Vitoria, Domingo de Soto, Luis de León — School of Salamanca; concepts of just price, contracts, and international trade.

4. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.

5. Werner Sombart, The Bourgeois and The Jews and Economic Life.

6. Wilhelm Röpke, The Social Crisis of Our Time.

José Octavio Dettmann 

Rio de Janeiro, October 26, 2015.

Rio de Janeiro, March 9, 2026.